THE CHARITABLE FOUNDATION:
ITS GOVERNANCE*
LAWRENCE M. STONEt
INTRODUCTION

Private foundations have several characteristics that distinguish them from
other charitable institutions: (1) they are generally dependent on a single
donor (or family) for their funds and derive none of their financial support
from broader based public fund raising; (2) they have a unique independence
since they often retain contributions received as a capital fund and spend only
the income which the capital fund earns; and (3) rather than operating
charitable aid programs or research activities themselves, they usually make
grants to other charities, institutions, or individuals to carry on such work.
Thus, they are a relatively permanent, non-governmental source of floating
capital endowment for alternative public purpose activities. This uniquely uncommitted endowment gives the private foundation its singular freedom to
act, a freedom which is at once its greatest virtue and its most vulnerable vice.
The private foundations' independence, flexibility, and ability to respond
to changing times and new problems' make these organizations perhaps the
most valuable and most essential segment of the entire private nonprofit sector. No other private charitable institution or organizational structure seems
so perfectly lesigned to respond to the changing needs of a democratic,
pluralistic society.
Despite the apparent advantages of the private foundation, over a period
of years it has been the object of more criticism than any other single area of
private philanthropy. As a result, in recent years it has increasingly been
placed in a less favorable position than other so-called publicly supported
charities with regard to federal tax benefits.
There are several main explanations of what has led to the private
foundation's susceptibility to criticism:
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1. These attributes have been described by the collective tern "venture philanthropy."
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(a) Contributions to private foundations come from wealthy families. Any
controversy or criticism regarding such large concentrations of wealth in our
society is easily transferable to the private foundations created with this
wealth. Indeed, such criticism of the private foundation may actually be an
2
expression of dislike for the institution of private property.
(b) Large tax benefits are usually associated both with the creation and
operation of foundations. These benefits lower the cost of charitable giving.
However, as the burden of taxation becomes heavier, especially for the
middle-income taxpayer, scapegoats are sought. The private foundation, having only a small, albeit wealthy, voting constituency is especially vulnerable to
criticism in this regard due to its image as a tax haven for the wealthy.
(c) Some private foundations have been set up and operated for the private purposes of their donors; some pursue goals that have little if any relation to the public interest; still others have accumulated income while spending little on current charitable or public needs. These clear abuses of the tax
benefits already received and of the public trust status of contributed funds
have brought criticism to bear on all foundations and indeed on all philanthropy. Increased enforcement efforts and changes in the law, especially the
Tax Reform Act of 1969, have done much to reduce the possibility of such
abuses. But some, arguably needed, steps-such as ensuring gradual relinguishment of donor control-have yet to be taken. Furthermore, what some
view as overly generous "grandfather" clauses-such as requirements in the
1969 Act for divestment of business control 3-have weakened the reform. In
any event the public image of the private foundation has been slow to change.
(d) If foundations are fulfilling their promised role, they exploit their
unique independence by engaging in new, innovative, and often controversial
activities. Because of this, foundations have from time to time been heavily
criticized from all sides-by Republicans and Democrats, tax conservatives and
tax liberals, populists and propertied interests. Such criticism is usually a sign
of healthy vigor of the institution and will hopefully not be silenced.
(e) Many foundations-including those that may have performed their
fiduciary obligations flawlessly, without self-dealing or private benefits-have
nevertheless remained truly "private." Generally speaking, this means that
they are controlled by a small and self-perpetuating group consisting either of
the donor and the donor's family or of others who have gained control
through their relationships to the original control group. Furthermore,
foundations-even those that are not so closely controlled-have with few exceptions drawn their directors and chief personnel from a narrow and rela-

2.

See Liles & Blum, Development of the Federal Tax Treatment of Charities, 39 LAW & CONTEMP.

PROB. no.

3.

4, at 6 (1975).

See generally Worthy, The Tax Reform Act of 1969: Consequences for Private Foundations, 39
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. no. 4, at 232 (1975).
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tively homogeneous base. Many foundations also have been reluctant to disclose adequate information about their finances and activities, doing so only
under the heaviest of criticism or because of government regulation.
Since private foundations are dependent on neither public fund raising
nor public membership, it is not surprising that they have tended to exhibit
characteristics of "privateness." Yet such uncontrolled, narrowly based power,
especially when it enjoys the benefit of tax support, cannot be expected to be
popular in our society. The few private foundations that have managed successfully to emerge from this stereotype and have progressed beyond this
state of privateness might be well advised to refer to themselves as "charitable
foundations" or "public foundations"-even though the effect is concededly
cosmetic.

4

The purpose of this paper is to examine current problems in the governance of private foundations, some of which have been summarized above,
and to suggest possible solutions to help quiet the private foundations' critics
without undermining the foundation's essential role. While directed at private
foundations, much of what is discussed is also applicable to other charitable
institutions that are similarly characterized by privateness or "non-publicness"
and that also may share some of the alleged weaknesses of the foundations'
governance structure.

LONG-RANGE STRATEGY

The grant-making private foundations will not continue to play an important role in American society unless it is determined that they are worth the
price society must pay to sustain them. The "price" has two aspects-one
monetary (tax incentives) and the other independence which, in effect, gives
to private persons the right to appropriate monies that would otherwise be
collected as taxes and appropriated by the legislature. 5 Presently foundations,

4.

Cf. the recommendation of the Commission on Private Philanthropy that a new category of

"independent" foundation be established. See GIVING IN AMERICA, infra note 6, at 172. "Such
organizations would enjoy the tax benefits of public charities in return for diminished influence
on the foundation's board by the foundation's benefactor or by his or her family or business
associates." Under the recommendation, governing boards of such foundations would be restricted to at most a minority representation by the donor, his family and associates. In return,
such organizations would not be subject to the limitations on giving that now apply to private
foundations, including the ceiling of 20 per cent of the giver's income that can be deducted from
income taxes of gifts to private foundations, the restriction against endowment gifts from income
of other foundations, and the exclusion from full eligibility to receive appreciated property that is
deductible at market price. Id. at 173.
5. For example, a donor, in the 50 per cent marginal tax bracket, is able to give to the
university of his choice one hundred dollars for each fifty dollars sacrifice in after-tax dollars. For
a discussion of the effect this has on giving see Kirkwood & Mundel, The Role of Tax Policy in
Federal Support for Higher Education, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. no. 4, at nn. 84, 85 (1975). The
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notwithstanding the considerable progress of recent years, continue as noted
above to enjoy a "precarious" image. Therefore a long range strategy must
be developed to improve the image of the private foundation.
There clearly are limits to what can be clone to lessen the political vulnerability of the private foundation. Once its public image has been tarnished
it is very difficult for an institution or group to rid itself of such a stigma.
This is especially so in the era of television communication when political success may depend on fifteen-second "spot" announcements. It is also an era in
which it is quite fashionable to challenge existing institutions as being "irrelevant" or in need of "radical" change. On the other hand there would appear
to be an appropriate strategy for the private foundation. Such a strategy
should be based first and foremost on fulfilling the theoretical promise of the
foundation to be the "cutting edge" of philanthropy, the sympathetic ear to
the "voices in the wilderness," and the patron of pathfinders.
However, as a precondition to their ability to act with such independence,
foundations must avoid making themselves easy targets for political criticism.
Abuses, and the potential for abuse, must be dealt with forthrightly and
promptly. Foundations as a group should be responsible first of all for playing a "watchdog role" over themselves. Furthermore, there is always the possibility that criticism of some charitable organizations will spill over to all
charitable institutions. Thus equally important to this long range strategy is
the willingness of foundations to take the lead in encouraging sound government regulation of all charity subject to the proviso that such regulation not
interfere with their own vital independence or that of other charitable institutions. Foundations should be in the forefront of delineating for the public
and for Congress those areas of all charitable activity that should be open to
reasonable government regulation.' The limitations on self-dealing and
other fifty dollars, tax savings, are monies which the donor is allowed effectively to designate to
the university rather than paying directly to the government to be appropriated by the Congress.
This latter element of present tax policy focuses on What is believed to be the central issue of
foundation governance. The precise tradeoffs in terms of efficiency or equity of the tax (or other
monetary) incentives to the donor and the desired level of total giving are beyond the scope of
this paper, Which will deal with only the second aspect: the "private appropriation"-or "private
governance"-price that society mav have to pay in order to sustain a desired level of giving to
private foundations. This same non-monetarv incentive may also be necessary in order to achieve
and retain foundation independence and flexibility, the two characteristics that are believed to be
their key values to society. The tradeoffs here are more delicately balanced, especially when independence and flexibility are at stake and a somewhat higher margin of safety may be called for
than in the case of the monetary (tax) incentives.
6. The many independent studies sponsored by the Commission of Private Philanthropy and
Public Needs are good examples of this potential role. For a list of these studies see COMM'N ON
PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLiC NEEDS,

GIVING IN

AMERICA: TOWARD A STRONGER VOLUNTARY

SECTOR app. 1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as GIVING IN AMERICA]. The studies are to be published in

a compendium by the Commission. The Commission also sponsored a "Donee" Group, a coalition
of public interest, social action, and Volunteer groups. This group published its report, COMM'N
ON

PRIVATE

PHILANTHROPY

AND

PUBLIC

NEEDS,

PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY:

VITAL AND INNOVATIVE?

OR PASSIVE AND IRRELEVANT? (1975) [hereinafter cited as Donee Group Report].
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control-of-business provisions recommended in 1965 by the Treasury Department and enacted in 1969 should, under this strategy, have received
strong and unqualified support by the foundation community. Similarly,
foundations should be receptive to reasonable demands for disclosure and
public accountability.'
However, it is not necessary-or advisable-that foundations and their
supporters accept as permanent any unnecessary concessions to government
regulation-such as the present tax benefit discriminations against gifts to
foundations in favor of gifts to "public charities." 8 Furthermore, an omnibus
approach aimed at preventing all possible abuses is unwise if it risks the seri-

ous curtailment of the foundation's independence and flexibility: to do so
could ultimately lead to the destruction of the institution we seek to preserve. 9
Some criticisms, for example those relating to financial self-dealing should,
and can be, and to a large extent have been, met by direct and rigorous
government regulation. Unfounded criticisms-such as charges that foundations control the economy or are responsible for high income taxes-shoud be
repudiated vociferously just as are such attacks on free speech, academic
freedom, and an independent judiciary, three other important bulwarks of a
free society. To deal with problems that fall somewhere in between, solutions
are discussed below that would combine private regulation with semigovernmental controls or legitimacy-creating devices.

7. See, for example, the recommendation of the Commission on Private Philanthropy and
Public Needs
that all tax exempt organizations be required to maintain "arms-length" business relationships with profit- making organizations or activities in which any principal of the exempt organization has a financial interest .... [And] that a system of federal regulation
be established for interstate charitable solicitations and that intrastate solicitations be
more effectively regulated by state governments.
GIVING IN AMERICA 24-25. The Commission also recommended that larger tax exempt organizations except churches and church-affiliates "be required to prepare and make readily available
detailed annual reports on their finances, programs and priorities" and further that "larger
grant-making organizations be required to hold annual*public meetings to discuss their programs,
priorities and contributions." The Donee Group also recommended expanded public information
requirements and annual public meetings. See Donee Group Report 21-23. In both cases the
recommendations for disclosure and public accountability would expand the requirements now
imposed on foundations and would extend them to cover almost all charitable organizations.
8. For a complete synopsis of these regulatory provisions see Worthy, supra note 3. See also
Wadsworth, Private Foundations and the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. no. 4,
at 255 (1975).
9. Attempts to provide absolute assurance that dollars committed to private foundations will
not be diverted to personal uses or spent in a narrow-i.e., not truly public-and unresponsive
way, will destroy the very reason for the existence of the private fiundation. An essential and
vital function of the private foundation in our society is to provide venture capital to initiate and
support activities in new and controversial areas where government will not, or cannot, provide
assistance. Under these circumstances, some degree of elitism is natural, some "slippage" will
occur, and many mistakes will be made-just as all of these imperfections occur daily in governmerits, in private enterprise, and in publicly-supported charities.
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If foundations have kept their own "skirts clean," they will then be in a
position to carry out the more important part of a long range strategy of
securing their recognition as vital to American society. This simply calls for
the fulfillment of their promise. Foundations should be far more active in
supporting through their grant-making process those ombudsman activities
now permitted by law."' In this era when voters are called upon to decide on
such complex matters as what degree of safety is required for nuclear power
plants, how much military power does the United States require to defend
itself, and what is appropriate economic policy to maintain full employment
and avoid inflation, free press, town hall meetings, and academic freedom do
not suffice. What are needed are extensive privately-supported research activities that will hopefully provide the necessary information for the press and
others to disseminate. Similarly, in these days of almost overwhelming power
of government, the protection of individual rights requires in many cases sustained and complex litigation that can be carried on only by public interest
groups.
Moreover, foundations and their supporters must convince Congress that
privately supported, nonprofit organizations are needed to counteract corporate and other private interest lobbies in federal, state, and local legislatures.
These activities are now largely foreclosed to charitable organizations,"' while
business interests are afforded wide latitude to conduct non-grassroots lobbying with tax deductible dollars in matters connected with their business interests. If private foundations were permitted to make grants in support of
lobbying activities, they would provide the requisite and vital counterforce to
12
large government and its consequent private business lobbies.

10. Examples abound: consumer law firms which challenge unfair business practices in the
courts; public auditors, such as Tax Analysts and Advocates-successful low-budget critics of the
Internal Revenue Service, the Treasury Department, and the Congress, whose persistent and
careful efforts led to the audit of President Nixon's tax returns; the Brookings Institute which
presents in an objective, scholarly fashion alternative courses of action for governmental fiscal
and economic policy.
To some extent both the Commission on Private Philanthropy and the Donee Group recognized the need to expand foundation grants in these areas. There was a difference of emphasis,
however. The Donee Group Report states that "although the Commission recognizes the support
of organizations such as these to be one of 'the enduring pragmatic functions seen for non-profit
organizations,' it does not make recommendations to remedy the lack of support which these
issues and organizations have received from the non-profit sector." Donee Group Report 5.
11. See Worthy, supra note 3; Wadsworth, supra note 8.
12. See the recommendation of the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs:
"That non-profit organization, other than private foundations, be allowed the same freedom to
attempt to influence legislation as are business corporations and trade associations, that toward
this end Congress remove the current limitation on such activity by charitable groups eligible to
receive tax-deductible gifts." GIvING IN AMERICA 26. See also the recommendations of the Donee
Group Report 40.
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1I
SOME SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

A.

Areas of Appropriate Government Regulation

To maintain public confidence in the integrity of the management of private foundations, government regulation should be exercised in a reasonable
manner to achieve:
(a) prevention of self-dealing or other forms of private benefit;
(b) prevention of "privateness" through full disclosure of foundation operations;
(c) relative safety of foundation investments;
(d) a balance between accumulation of capital and spending for present
needs;
(e) proper application of foundation funds, e.g., avoidance of improprieties, such as giving for political purposes; and
(f) to a limited extent, the prevention of "privateness" in the form of
indefinite control by donors or donees over any particular foundation.
B.

Avoidance of Government Regulation

To preserve foundation independence and to allow foundations to carry
out their missions, there should be no government regulation of the grantmaking process itself. This includes both selection of areas of interest by a
foundation and the actual making of grants to particular donees.
C.

Areas of Experimentation With Different
Regulatory Approaches

To encourage the continued growth of the private foundation while attempting to satisfy the justifiable demands for regulation, there should be
experimentation with private regulation. The Financial Accounting Standards
Board,13 established by independent public accountants, and private regulatory boards with compulsory membership under state law, such as the State
Bar of California, 14 can serve as possible models. These efforts might not bear
significant fruit and could pave the way for direct government regulation of
13. The Financial Accounting Standards Board is voluntarily financed on a long term basis by
the ten largest accounting firms.
14. All practicing attorneys must maintain dues paying membership. The Bar in turn carries
out, among many other activities, regulation of ethical practices of attorneys.
It is interesting to note that, effective January 1, 1976, California law requires that six nonattorneys be added to the Calfornia Bar's Board of Governors, apparently a first for any governing body of an American Bar. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6013.5 (West Supp. 1976). The six lay
persons will be appointed by the Governor of California subject to confirmation by the California
Senate. The new law also requires two lay members each on the Committee of Bar Examiners
and to the Disciplinary Board of the State Bar.
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program selection and grant-making. Despite such drawbacks, however, the
narrowness and the unresponsiveness of some private foundations demand
such experimentation. Two of the principal goals of such experimentation
should be to encourage the voluntary broadening of foundation management
and greater foundation responsiveness to the controversial and changing
1
needs of our society. 5
D. Limits on Control But Not on Size
While it does not seem necessary, at present, to place any limits on the size
or life of private foundations, there should be limits placed on the time during which a donor and related parties or donees may at first control, and later
substantially influence, the conduct of the private foundation. To encourage
new ideas and approaches, and to avoid prolonged control by persons falling
outside the donor and related party group, it may also be necessary to place
limits on the term of any single director.
E.

Equal Tax Treatment for Foundations
and Other Charitable Institutions

Finally, in order to promote the continued growth of private foundations
and to eliminate their stigmatized status, the present tax distinctions between
private foundations and other chairties should be abolished. Donors to private
foundations should be entitled to the same tax benefits now given to donors
to other institutions; private foundations should not be subject to heavier
taxes or auditing fees than other charitable organizations; and many of the
existing prohibitions such as that against self-dealing and control of businesses
now imposed on private foundations should logically and equitably be extended to all charitable institutions. Elimination of existing legal differences
between private foundations and other charitable institutions is needed not
only to remove an unfortunate stigma on foundations, and not only to eliminate the unwise distortion of charitable giving which such distinctions may
15. Both the Commission on Private Philanthropy and the Donee Group strongly urge these
two recommendations, the Commission by exhortation and the Donee Group "by law." The
Commission feared that the latter would "undermine an important distinction between the voluntary sector and government." The Donee Group, impatient with exhortation, claimed that compulsory expansion of governing boards to include significant representation from the "general
public," "non-profit agencies," and "in particular women and minorities" would "actually make
philanthropy more pluralistic." Donee Group Report 19. Notwithstanding the Donee Group's
claim, this concept of "pluralism" is not pluralism but is either "democratic representativeness" or
"proportional representation," in either event an entirely different matter and, as noted by the
Commission, essentially not distinguishable from government. Aside from definitional arguments,
the Donee Group unfortunately makes the frequent mistake of those impatient with the pace of
democratic progress when they confuse means and end. The Donee Group is concentrating on
end results. However if they choose the means of forcing democratic or proportional representations on philanthropy they might just as well direct their efforts to government and do away with
private philanthropy, having done away with its essential characteristics, namely, independence
from such government interference.
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create, but also because these existing distinctions themselves invite further
discrimination, representing as they do a kind of legislative presumption of
inferior status.
III
AREAS OF POTENTIAL GOVERNMENT REGULATION:
THE PROBLEM OF "PRIVATENESS"

A.

Solicitation of Funds

By definition the private foundation obtains funds from a single donor or
family. To require public funding or to otherwise restructure the support
base would destroy the very nature of the private foundation. While there are
admitted Virtues to the contention that publicly supported charities must
prove themselves continually in order to maintain a flow of donations, one of
the unique aspects of the private foundation is its independence from such
popular support. This makes the foundation less likely to be subject to public
passions and prejudices of the moment than almost any other institution in
our society. Even the wealthiest private university knows that "money [of its
donors] talks." Therefore, any suggestions that foundations be required to
solicit at least some funds from the public sector or perish is a route to "publicness" which should not be considered.
B.

Selection and Composition of the Government Board
Donor Control

Only a limited amount of direct governmental intervention can be safely
brought to bear on the composition of governing boards of private foundations without destroying the independence of existing foundations and without negatively affecting the establishment of new foundations. Some objective
legislative limits restricting only the scope and duration of donor-and
donee-control may be tolerated. These legal minima could be supplemented
by semiprivate mechanisms that would indirectly seek to accomplish goals not
safely attainable through direct legislation or direct governmental regulation.
Plainly, the governing boards of foundations must be nondemocratic.
They must remain so if they are to provide any alternative to the political
establishment. This necessarily involves a certain risk of "narrowness." Yet,
for foundations to play a significant role they must be prepared to respond to
changing times and needs. They must therefore continuously seek to broaden
their outlook either through changes in their staffs or their boards or at least
through the scope and outlook of their grant-making programs. In sum, they
must endeavor to act in a "public" and "responsive" fashion (even though
such concepts are not amenable to precise definition) or their future will sim-
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ply not be secure. More importantly, unless they so behave they will not fulfill
the promise of their role as an independent source of power on the frontiers
of charity, probing new and controversial causes, to ever give new strength
and vitality to a democratic society and to challenge the democratic majority
and the conventional wisdom.
Furthermore, if any single factor preponderates in subjecting foundations
to political criticism, it is the image of nondemocratic control by the donor or
his surrogates. Donor control or substantial influence on a board creates, at
least, apparent possibilities for selfish operation and self-dealing. The rules
promulgated by the Tax Reform Act of 1969,16 extensive as they are, have
not eliminated this possibility. One of the key elements of the Tax Reform
Act of 1969 is section 4943 which imposes a penalty tax on certain excess
business holdings and which is designed to prevent foundation control of business. Section 4943 was recommended by the Treasury Department and
adopted by the Congress on the theory that foundation control of business
can be harmful because, among other reasons, it affords the opportunity for
very subtle and difficult to detect forms of self-dealing. It was for similar
reasons that the 1965 Treasury Department Report recommended that control of foundations by donors be limited to a twenty-five year period:' 7
It [the proposed limit on donor control] would limit the time period within
which abuses could occur through the exercise of substantial donor influence;
and, by assuring the donor that his actions would ultimately be subject to
independent review it would tend to protect the foundation from abuse even
during its first 25 years. By enabling independent private parties to evaluate
the performance and potentiality of the foundation after 25 years of operation and granting them power to terminate the organization, then or later,
the measure would provide a method for eliminating foundation[s] which
have doubtful or minimal utility. Finally, in broadening the base of foundation management, the recommendation would bring fresh views to the
foundation's councils, combat parochialism, and augment the flexibility of the
organization in responding to social needs and changes.'
The Congress did not act affirmatively on this recommendation. However, for
the reason above cited, the same kind of recommendation is made here.
More specificially,'the recommendation has two main parts: (1) adopt a
gradual reduction of donor and related-party presence on the board, and (2)

16. The Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 85 Stat. 487, added chapter 42, sections 4940-48 to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which rival in their complexity such notable
areas of the Internal Revenue Code as subpart F dealing with "tax haven" corporations and,
more recently, the provision of the Employees Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 Stat.
829 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 31, 42 U.S.C.). These rules provide a comprehensive pattern of prohibitions and control of foundation behavior enforced through a series of
sanctions in the form of severe penalty taxes.
17.

U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, 89TH CONG.,

(Comm. Print 1965).
18. Id.

IST SESS.,
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limit the term of any person other than the donor. Substantial donees' of the
foundation and essentially nonindependent persons such as direct or indirect
employees, attorneys, accountants, and bankers of the donor or his family
should also be included within the related party category. Since the details of
such a recommendation cannot be derived from pure logic but must be based
on a subjective balancing of objectives, the rules sketched out below are suggestions to demonstrate the kind of details that implementation of the main
2 11
recommendations would entail.

Slightly different rules would be needed for inter vivos contributions and
for contributions made on the death of the donor. In the case of a donor who
created a foundation and funded it during his lifetime, the donor himself
could be allowed to remain on the foundation board for his lifetime. This
would leave unimpaired a significant motivation for the formation of foundations by wealthy donors. On the other hand the make-up of the board should
be limited as follows in the case of such inter vivos foundations:
(a) "Control" of the board by the donor and related parties should be
eliminated after a relatively short period of time such as, e.g., 71/2 years. Persons within the "donor group" should be defined even more broadly than the
category of "disqualified persons" under existing law and, in particular, to
include substantial donees of the foundation. "Control" could be defined as
the ability to cause the foundation to act (normally evidenced by more than
50 per cent of the voting power of the board or other governing body).
(b) After relinquishing control, the donor group as defined above would
be allowed "substantial influence" on the board for another period of 72
years. "Substantial influence" could be defined as more than 20 per cent, but

19.

Defined as a Olonee that received more than five per cent of the foundation's total grants

for the year or for the last "x" number of years.
20. In this regard compare the recommendations of Senator Edward Kennedy, the Donee
Group, and the Commission. It is the recommendation of Senator Edward Kennedy that, after
the first twenty-five years of existence of the foundation, the creator and members of his family
be limited to 25 per cent of the membership of the managing board of the foundation. In the
case of organizations in existence for more than ten years, the period would be fifteen years from
the effective date of the new law. 122 CONG. REc. 3755 (daily ed. March 18, 1976). Senator
Kennedy noted that
[a]lthough the recent [Commission on Philanthropy] study did not make any specific
recommendations to restrict donor control of private foundations, the above proposal is
consistent with its statement that Congress examine the issue. The Commission did espouse "the general view that openness and accessibility are as important for donorcontrolled foundations as for other philanthropic, non-profit organizations. If, in any
particular organization, relinquishing a degree of donor control serves to further the
cause of greater accessibility, then the course should, we feel, be positively pursued."
Id. at 3764. While Senator Kennedy's recommendation would move more slowly than that recommended herein, the impatient Donee Group recommended that the governing boards of all
foundations be required by law "to have no less than V3 public members immediately and no less
than 2A public members after 5 years. Public members would be defined negatively to eliminate
donors, their relatives and business associates." Donee Group Report 17.
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less than 50 per cent, of the voting power of the board. Thereafter, only less
than substantial influence would be permitted.
(c) In any event, the terms of all persons serving on the board (except the
principal donor) would be limited to a period of no more than five years, with
no possibility of reappointment. In some cases, this might result in the elimination of donor control and substantial influence over a shorter period than
required above.
In the case of foundations which are substantially created by testamentary
gifts, the following should apply:
(a) So that the donor has some assurance that his charitable goals will be
carried out, it might be reasonable to allow his immediate family to control
the foundation for the same 7 -year period specified for inter vivos foundations. The "immediate family" would be limited to the donor's spouse, children, and grandchildren.
(b) There appears to be no compelling policy reason to allow other, more
remote, donor-related parties (such as his attorneys, accountants, or business
employees) to control the foundation after the donor's death or to play any
substantial role in assisting the immediate family in its initial control role.
Therefore, during the initial 7 -year period these other disqualified persons
could serve, along with the immediate family in the capacity of a control
group, but should themselves be limited to no more than 20 per cent of the
board.
(c) After the initial 7 -year period following the donor's death and the
creation of the foundation, the donor's family together with other disqualified
parties would be allowed no more than substantial influence (more than 20
per cent, but less than 50 per cent, of voting power) on the board for another
7/2 years. Thereafter, only less than substantial influence would be permitted.
(d) The terms of all board members would be limited to one five-year
term with the possible exception of the donor's spouse, children, and grandchildren who, as surrogates of the donor, might be allowed to serve more
than five years (perhaps ten years) but not a lifetime. In any event, this exception should not be used to circumvent the provisions requiring no control
after 7 years and no more than substantial influence after fifteen years.
These periods of permitted donor control and substantial influence should
be sufficiently generous so as not to interfere significantly with the principal
donor's motivation to impress a desired character on a foundation, and thus
should not lessen the donor's incentives to create and fund the foundation.
And yet, these limits are an objective and enforceable way of dealing with one
pressing aspect of the need to achieve publicness for foundations. Alone, they
will not ensure publicness, but at least they are an attempt to ameliorate one
aspect of privateness. Such governmental regulation need not be an incursion
on the foundation's independence: it merely limits the control of the foundation by one exclusive private group.
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In addition to these suggestions for the gradual elimination of donor control and substantial influence over a fifteen-year period, strong anti-selfdealing, anti-business control, and anti-accumulation rules (as contained in the
Tax Reform Act of 1969) must be maintained. Full disclosure of foundation
finances, grant-making procedures and results would also significantly improve foundation publicness.

IV
PRIVATE OR SEMI-GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF
BOARD COMPOSITION AND CONDUCT

Direct governmental regulation of the selection and composition of the
board is generally inconsistent with the desired pluralistic and independent
nature of the foundation. While all of the recommendations in the preceeding
section would go a long way toward removing some of the actual and political
weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the private foundation, it would still be susceptible to the charge that foundations are non-public and non-responsive
even when they are not controlled by the donor (or parties related in some
way to the donor). These could be allegations that the composition of foundation boards is narrow in origin, background, outlook, and interests; that they
are elitist, unimaginative, and unsystematic in setting priorities; that they are
not accessible to some groups. Such characteristics, and especially the fact that
they are not democratically representative, are not necessarily faults. Indeed,
these characteristics may be virtues, since a foundation whose directors were
chosen like legislators would present no real alternative to governmental support.
However, if it could be shown that these characteristics limit the
foundation's very ability to respond to public needs or its ability to provide a
real alternative to public sector support, then such privateness would be not
only a political disadvantage, but also diametrically in opposition to the
avowed goals of the foundation in our society. Policy alternatives in this regard might be to:
(a) dismiss the charges as minor imperfections which should be ignored
since they will cure themselves over time and cannot be handled through any
kind of regulation without seriously damaging the foundation;
(b) accept the charges as serious but limit their correction to nongovernmental methods of regulation, perhaps, with minimal intervention in
providing "legitimacy" to otherwise private regulators; or
(c) treat the charges as serious and risk the damage that might ensue from
direct governmental regulation.
The first course involves no action other than defensive argumentation
and possibly vague exhortations to foundations to "do better." Little more can
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be said about this first alternative which involves a complex balancing of questions such as the political strength of the foundation and the seriousness with
which one views governmental or private intrusion into this area. A realistic
assessment would reject this "do-nothing" position as neither necessary for the
preservation of the most vital aspects of foundations nor politically safe. Certainly no one would argue that there are no limits on who may be a fiduciary.
For example, it would probably not be problematical if government were to
provide that the following persons could not sit on a board: a minor, an alien,
a convicted felon, an elected government official, a major supplier of services
21
to the foundation, or a repeating and willful, self-dealing board member.
Limits on the terms of fiduciaries and on the extent and duration of donor
control are surely more serious matters but are still relatively mechanical regulations which need not involve direct governmental intrusion into foundation
decision-making. The third alternative must be rejected outright as simply
inconsistent with the raison d'Otre of the foundation.
The second alternative, limited private regulations, seems superficially attractive; however, the problems with this approach are also serious:
(a) How could a private regulatory body be endowed with the "legitimacy"
or enforcement sanctions necessary to make it effective?
(b) How could it obtain independence from the persons and institutions it
regulates?
(c) Could it set any uniform and objective standards for behavior that
would be useful and sensible?
As previously noted the Financial Accounting Standards Board in the accounting field is one possible model for self regulation. However, the process
of setting standards is extremely difficult in the foundation area. There is no
single standard for correct behavior in program selection, grant-making, or in
board composition for a foundation, perhaps because foundations must be
pluralistic in such respects-that is, promotive of differences, not uniformity.
Moreover, even if regulations could be devised, there are no ready-made
sanctions for failure to comply in the foundation area as there are in the
accounting field. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants can,
as part of its rules of ethics, require its members not to certify statements
which are contrary to the standards set by the Financial Accounting Standards
Board. Furthermore, certain government agencies such as the Securities and
Exchange Commission have also adopted certain of these standards thereby
legitimizing them. In view of the lack of possible uniform standards, it is difficult to conceive of similar sanctions in the foundation field. Finally, it should
be noted that there are already serious criticisms of the FASB which raise
21. While these latter rules are undoubtedly less objectionable even to the most ardent opponent of government interference, it must be stated that it is not here suggested evidence that
such persons are today sitting on boards.
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questions about its ability to act independently enough to fend off direct government regulation. Nor would any California lawyer be completely sanguine
about the success of the California State Bar as a model of effective semiprivate regulation.
Nevertheless, because the charges of foundation privateness and narrowness are serious, such semi-private models must be considered and something
like a Foundation Evaluation Board should be tried, at least on an experimental basis. Such a board could be given financial independence in several ways.
It is conceivable that the largest foundations might agree to fund the activities
of a Foundation Evaluation Board over an extended period, such as ten years.
This would allow for the appointment to the board on a full-time, long range
basis of capable and independent persons. Their tenure could be sufficiently
long-five to seven years, for example-to provide them with true independence. The financing could also provide for adequate staffing.
An alternative financing method would be to combine private regulation
with some form of governmental participation in order to provide legitimacy.
Such a course might require that all private foundations register with the
Foundation Evaluation Board solely for the purpose of paying a certain
amount of dues per year. Government could also help by making it mandatory to supply the board with needed data. Even if nothing further were done
this would provide such a Foundation Evaluation Board with more prestige,
legitimacy, and independence than if it were merely funded by the ten or
twenty largest foundations.
While it would be relatively easy to provide some degree of independence
through financing and tenure, selecting the board members of a Foundation
Evaluation Board would pose more serious problems. Here one could conceive of a variety of sources of appointments that would guarantee a modicum of independence. Some members might be selected by the foundations
themselves; others by the Secretaries of the Treasury and Health, Education,
and Welfare; still others by various associations of charitable organizations.
An adequately funded and legitimized board with adequate staff could
develop, over an experimental period of ten years, useful functions for itself
that would meet some of the challenges in this area. For example, it could
draft standards for the fair and prompt processing of applications and for
publicizing the areas of foundation interest and results of the award process;
it could systematically gather information about the composition of foundation boards and key staff personnel; it could encourage both of the areas of
foundation concern and of governing board composition.
Setting up a board of this nature could pave the way for an eventual
takeover of its functions by a government agency. Moreover, the very criticisms raised by this board might be used by some critics of private foundations as further evidence of the need to curtail or eliminate the foundation as
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we know it today. However, it is believed that these dangers are, on balance,
worth risking in view of the dangers of a "do nothing" policy.2 2
V
COMMUNITY

FOUNDATIONS: AN INAPPROPRIATE MODEL

Another possible policy alternative might be modeled on regulations now
being developed by the Internal Revenue Service which would establish
criteria to determine whether "community foundations" will be treated under
the existing tax laws as publicly supported charities rather than private
foundations.2" Many of these community foundations receive substantial
amounts of their support from a limited number of donors and cannot meet
the usual test for publicly supported charities. However, the comparison between them and private foundations does not hold up under close analysis,
and this alternative is probably inappropriate in the foundation sphere.
Community foundations are essentially local institutions; they obtain funds
from the general public, generally engage in rather noncontroversial charity
programs of a local nature, and even where there is controversy, there is
often a tendency to move toward a consensus basis. Any effort to implement
this kind of approach for private foundations would come dangerously close
22. The Donee Group, evidencing a rather short memory considering the relatively recent
Watergate experience, criticized the Report of the Commission on Private Philanthropy because
"fear of government pervades the Report." Donee Group Report 14. Even were not the experiences of Watergate so fresh in our memories, it should be easy to recall that the basic reason for
philanthropy, and in particular for the private foundation, is as an alternative to government.
Fear of government intervention is thus quite sensible. The Donee Group also criticized the
Commission for excessive confidence in self regulation. The Donee Group dimly remembered
Watergate when it recommended the removal of the supervisory function regarding exempt organizations from the IRS and the creation of a new, independent regulatory commission with a
presidentially appointed board reflecting all elements of private philanthropy, including donees.
It forgets that Watergates can reach even such agencies as the SEC. It also recommended a
permanent standing committee in the House and Senate having oversight responsibility over such
an agency.
The Commission recommended that a permanent national commission on the nonprofit sector
be established by Congress whose role would be to continue, in effect, the work of the Commission on Philanthropy itself. One half of the commissions's membership would be named by the
President, subject to Senate confirmation, and the other half by the presidential appointees themselves. Funding for the commission would come half from government, half from private sources.
See Stone, Federal Tax Support of Charities and Other Exempt Organizations: The Need for a National
PoliCy, U. So. CAL. 1968 TAX INST. 27, 77.

23. This approach would begin with a government definition of "publicness," dependent on a
variety of factors. There would be several ways in which a private foundation might satisfy the
requirements that it be "public." For example, possible factors would include: the extent to which
the foundation's directors are chosen by outside agencies, such as public officials or groups of
donees; the extent to which the foundation seeks to raise outside funds; and the extent to which
a foundation formally chooses its board members from different fields and different representative groups, such as clergymen, educators, civic leaders, or university officials. See Proposed
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(10)-(19), 36 Fed. Reg. 19598 (1971) and Proposed Treas. Reg.
§ 1.507-2(a)(8), 36 Fed. Reg. 19601 (1971).
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to either democratizing them, which would undermine their role as an independent alternative, or would commit their funds to ongoing activities such as
are the endowments of operating charities, which would seriously undermine
the foundation's flexibility.
VI
LIMITATIONS ON MINIMUM OR MAXIMUM SIZE

Many critics claim that government-imposed limitations on foundation
size-either on a minimum or a maximum basis-should exist. Some contend
that foundations that are too small are apt to abuse their public trust since
they are too numerous and too difficult to police. Furthermore it is argued
that they are not apt to do useful work in view of their limited funds and
limited staffing. While this is a question of competing alternatives, many small
foundations have been useful and have played an important role in the general scheme of foundation affairs. It appears most unwise to extinguish the
opportunity for small, but varied, pluralism without serious evidence that the
government is indeed unable to police such foundations and that indeed they
are wasteful. No such evidence is as yet available. In fact, government regulation already imposed by the Tax Reform Act of 1969 has proven to be too
expensive and onerous for many small foundations, so much so that many
have been terminated and it is suspected that new ones have not been formed
in view of the new requirements.

24

As to maximum size, some would contend that it is unwise to give as much
power to a single board as is now held, for example, by the board of the Ford
Foundation. In view of the fact that many of the largest foundations have
performed better than average, these charges are probably not substantial.

There is no evidence that large foundations have acted less adventurously
than the average medium-size foundations, nor that they have stifled or
molded research to the detriment of the pluralism we seek. It would seem
that we need more, not less, large foundations at the present time. Furthermore, it seems that like good wines, foundations also improve with age; generally the "horror" examples of the Treasury 1965 report and others are not
the Carnegie and other "mature" foundations. If the previously discussed
recommendations for regulating foundations are carried out, there would be
no cogent reasons to limit the size of foundations nor to limit their life or
duration.
CONCLUSIONS

Since by definition the private foundation normally obtains its funds from
a single donor or family, to require public support or to change in any way
24.

See Worthy, supra note 3.
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this source of funding would be to destroy the very nature of the private
foundation. To require such publicness is not a feasible or desirable alternative for the foundation as we know it. While little government regulation can
be safely brought to bear in the area of choosing the governing board and
management of a foundation without destroying its independence and without adversely affecting the creation of new foundations, some modest limits
for restricting the scope and duration of donor control and influence might
well be incorporated. The benefits from such limits appear to outweigh the
possible risks of such action or non-action.
Moreover, governmental regulation could possibly play a role in the manner in which the board and key staff govern the foundation. A board essentially performs two major functions: first, it manages the foundation's funds
and oversees budgetary planning; second, it selects areas of program interest
and determines who will receive individual grants. Government can directly
regulate the first function without detriment to the foundation's role. On the
other hand, the very heart of the foundation is its independence in selecting
areas in which grants will be made and in making the individual grants, and
these must be kept free of government regulation and should be subjected, at
most, to systematic, privately supported or semi-governmental evaluation and
criticism.

